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A B S T R A C T
The opening of new areas for offshore drilling in the Arctic is highly controversial. As ice cover in the region is
melting at an alarming rate, new areas have been opened for petroleum industry in the Norwegian Barents Sea.
Our qualitative analysis examines risks related to the petroleum operations in the newly opened areas and
provides insight into the complex and socially constructed nature of the risks. With the use of visual influence
diagram- based mental modelling approach, we demonstrate the multiple ways in which the risks are understood
and defined. We also analyse the type of knowledge that the risk frames are based on. The influence diagrams
present the risk frames in a clear, visual, form. The study indicates that the existing governance framework fails
to treat the ambiguity around oil spill risks: the current risk assessments and risk management do not reflect on
the multiple ways in which the participants in this study 1) frame the problem situation, 2) how they identify
different measures to manage risks, and 3) what are considered as key knowledge needs and knowledge pro-
ducers by the participants. We suggest that social learning and collaborative knowledge production are needed
to move towards developing shared understanding of the problem situation. Finally, we suggest that the rigorous
examination and the unveiling of ambiguity may help developing deliberative risk governance measures and
moving towards sustainability transformations.
1. Introduction
Ice cover in the Barents Sea is receding fast due to climate change:
the Barents Sea is expected to become the first ice-free Arctic region by
around 2050 (AMAP, 2017b). As the ice is retreating, new areas are
becoming increasingly accessible for economic activities such as ship-
ping and offshore oil and gas drilling. For the Arctic states, the potential
economic gains are alluring. In Norway, new areas have been opened
for both oil exploration and exploitation as part of the 23rd and 24th
licensing rounds.
The decision to open new areas for maritime operations remains
highly controversial. The risks of offshore operations closer to the ice
edge are exacerbated due to the possible presence of ice, harsh weather
conditions, insufficient infrastructure, and the ineffectiveness of current
prevention and response technologies in iced-conditions (AMAP,
2017a; Arctic Council, 2009; Bambulyak et al., 2014; Gulas et al., 2017;
Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC, Pearson Consulting, LLC,
2010; Sydnes and Sydnes, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2017). Considering
the contribution of fossil fuels to climate change, opening new areas for
petroleum industry impede reaching the goals of the Paris climate
agreement (AMAP, 2017b; CICERO, 2017; ICCP, 2018; McGlade and
Ekins, 2014; Petrick et al., 2017).
The complex nature of oil spill risks presents serious challenges in
oil spill risk governance. Conventionally, oil spill risks are considered in
terms of probabilities and consequences alone (e.g. Goerlandt and
Montewka, 2015; Lehikoinen et al., 2015; Spaulding, 2017). Oil spill
risks can be considered systemic risks that are characterized by high
levels of complexity and surrounded by uncertainty as well as ambi-
guity i.e. differing, and often conflicting, perceptions of risks, and so-
cietal values (Renn, 2008; Renn et al., 2011). Recognizing the sub-
jective and value-laden nature of risks is a necessary part of risk
management decisions (Slovic, 2001).
The current regulatory framework for oil spill risks in the Barents
Sea comprises different regulatory measures, strict industry standards
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(e.g. ISO, CEN and NORSOK standards), the ecosystem-based manage-
ment plan for the Barents Sea, and the comprehensive oil spill response
and preparedness system. However, the risk assessments and risk
management have largely focused on natural sciences and engineering
studies and the management outcomes have failed to reflect the mul-
tiple viewpoints and meanings of the diversity of stakeholder concerns
as well as the different systems of knowledge and sources of knowledge
(Blanchard et al., 2014; Hauge et al., 2014; Knol, 2010a, 2010b).
In the context of high uncertainty and diversity of values, colla-
borative approaches and the integration of different types of knowledge
in risk governance processes is highlighted (Chateauraynaud, 2009; de
Marchi, 2015; Failing et al., 2007; Gregory et al., 2006; Jasanoff, 1998,
2003; Klinke and Renn, 2012; Petts, 2004; Renn et al., 2011; Van Der
Sluijs et al., 2005). For example, Renn et al. (2011) call for inclusive
and integrative risk governance approaches for complex risks. In the
same vein, some highlight the need for moving from expert calculations
to integrated approaches challenging the idea that we can prevent and
restore damage by more advanced technologies alone (De Marchi,
2015). Failing et al. (2007) explore how to integrate both local and
scientific knowledge in environmental decision-making with the use of
a practical structured decision process. Petts (2004) discusses the bar-
riers to participation and deliberation in risk decisions. Previous re-
search on management of risks of offshore drilling in the Lofoten area,
Norway, emphasize that due to the contested nature of risks, it is im-
portant to look at the process of how scientific knowledge is constructed
and translated to policy context (Knol, 2010a, 2010b) and that there is
a need for participatory dialogue, involving all relevant knowledge and
value systems, in order to elicit the uncertainties associated with rou-
tine petroleum operations (Blanchard et al., 2014).
This study contributes to the discussion by exploring how to cope
with ambiguity in oil spill risk governance in the Barents Sea. We use an
influence diagram-based mental modelling approach to gain a better
understanding of the way risks related to the offshore operations are
framed and understood. We define ambiguity as a distinct type of un-
certainty that refers to the different ways of understanding, inter-
preting, and knowing reality (Brugnach et al., 2008). This signifies that
ambiguity can’t be interpreted in isolation, but only in the socio-tech-
nical-environmental context where it is produced in, i.e. within its
frame (Brugnach et al., 2008).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the case
study and describes the key sources of knowledge in the process to-
wards opening new areas. Section 3 provides the theoretical back-
ground to the study and introduces the use of influence diagrams that
aid to identify and illustrate the complex nature of oil spill risks. Section
4 presents the results of the study, and in Section 5, the different risk
frames as well as the need for collaborative risk governance measures
and social learning are discussed. Section 6 is for conclusions.
We posit that paying attention to the various risk frames provides a
way of coping with ambiguity in risk governance in the Barents Sea.
The study indicates the need for knowledge co-production and social
learning processes in risk governance. Finally, we suggest that the
rigorous examination and the unveiling of ambiguity may help devel-
oping deliberative risk governance measures and moving towards sus-
tainability transformations.
2. Case study
The Barents Sea is a high latitude Arctic shelf sea (AMAP, 2017a). It
is one of the most productive oceans in the world: it hosts more than
two hundred species of fish as well as diverse communities of plankton,
seabirds and mammals (AMAP, 2017a; Eriksen et al., 2017; Jakobsen
and Ozhigin, 2011; NMCE 2014). Especially the frontal zones, the polar
front (the boundary front between Arctic water and the Atlantic water)
and the marginal ice zone (MIZ; the transitional zone between ice-
covered sea and the open sea), are highly productive and support
plankton booms that provide food supplies for fish, seabirds and marine
mammals (AMAP, 2017a; NMCE 2014).
In recent years, the Norwegian government has opened new areas in
the Barents Sea for both oil exploration and exploitation. Oil and gas
revenues provide a large source of revenue for Norway. Norway is the
world’s 8th largest exporter for crude oil and crude oil is one of the most
important commodities for Norwegian economy (NPD and NMPE,
2018). The Barents Sea is estimated to hold up to 65% of the total
undiscovered oil and gas resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf
(NPD, 2017) and to ensure future revenues, Norway is investing in new
technologies to reduce the price of drilling as well as expanding oil
production further in the North (Knol and Arbo, 2014).
The decision for opening the Barents Sea southeast to petroleum
activity was made in 2013 by the Norwegian parliament (“Opening of
the Barents Sea Southeast (Meld. St. 36 (2012–2013)” (NMPE, 2013a)
and “Supplementary white paper - Opening of the Barents Sea South-
east (Meld. St. 41 (2012–2013)”(NMPE, 2013b). This policy is in line
with the Meld. St. 28 “An industry for the future” (NMPE, 2011) report,
which outlines the future directions of petroleum industry in Norway
and highlights petroleum industry as “a key activity in Norway for
decades to come” (NMPE, 2011). The decision followed the Treaty on
Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the
Arctic Ocean between Russia and Norway (2011), under which the
Barents Sea southeast is recognized as a part of the Norwegian Con-
tinental Shelf. An impact assessment under the Petroleum Act was
conducted for the Barents Sea southeast in 2012–2013.
New areas are opened as part of licensing rounds under the
Petroleum Act that provides the general legal basis for sound resource
management1 . The licences grant petroleum companies the right and
duty to carry out exploration drilling, seismic surveys, and other ac-
tivities. In January 2015, as part of the 23rd licensing round, the Nor-
wegian government opened up 54 blocks in the Barents Sea. These
include blocks in further northernly and easterly areas than in the past:
eight blocks were situated North of the 74th parallel and another eight
along the Russian borderline. In 2016, the Ministry of Petroleum further
announced the nomination of blocks for the 24th licensing round on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf (Fig. 1). In June 2018, the Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy offered further 9 production licenses in the
Barents Sea. Three of the new production licenses are in the 74th par-
allel including a total of six blocks, whereas 27 blocks are located in the
73rd parallel. (NPD, 2018; Staalesen, 2018).
Norway has developed ecosystem-based management plans for its
marine areas. The overall framework for oil and gas activities (such as
permitted areas, restrictions on when drilling is permitted, and identi-
fication of particularly vulnerable areas) is established in the integrated
management plans. The process towards the management plans has
been cross-sectoral including different government agencies and sci-
entific institutions (Knol, 2010a,b; Olsen et al., 2016; Sander, 2018).
The establishment of the first integrated management plan for all the
marine areas was concretized in the White Paper Nr. 12 (2001–2002):
Rent og Rikt Hav (NME, 2001). Following the 2001 White Paper, the
integrated management plan for the Barents Sea and the Lofoten islands
was ratified by the government in 2006 (Report No. 8 to the Storting
(2005–2006): Integrated Management of the Marine Environment of
the Barents Sea and the Sea Areas off the Lofoten Islands) (NME 2006),
and updated in 2011 (Meld. St. 10 (2010–2011) (NME, 2011) and in
2015 (Meld. St. 20 (2014–2015) (NMCE, 2015). The 2011 updated
management plan focuses on Lofoten and Vesterålen islands, and Senja
island. The 2015 updated plan focuses especially on the marginal ice
1 Production licences are awarded in two rounds: the ordinary licensing
rounds and the Awards for Predefined Areas (APAs). APAs comprise of the
mature areas on the shelf i.e. areas with known geology and existing and
planned infrastructure. The ordinary rounds are for the frontier parts of the
Norwegian continental shelf, including the southeast and northern areas of the
Barents Sea.
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zone and on preparedness and response systems for acute pollution in
icy waters. The plan also identifies the particularly valuable and vul-
nerable areas where restricted conditions or prohibition are set for
petroleum (Fig. 2).
The newly opened areas are closer to these particularly valuable and
vulnerable areas, such as the marginal ice zone (MIZ), than areas that
have previously been opened for exploration and exploitation. The MIZ
is identified as particularly valuable and vulnerable area in the 2006
and 2011 management plans, but in the 2015 plan, the MIZ has been
delimited to better present the current ice conditions (NMCE, 2015). As
the data used in the previous management plans was no longer con-
sidered as representative of the current ice conditions, the marginal ice
zone was redefined in using new data available for the period
1985−2014. The marginal ice zone is defined to follow a line joining
areas where sea ice is present on 30% of the days in April, i.e. the MIZ is
delimited using a minimum ice persistence of 30%. The presence of ice
means that the proportion of the sea surface covered by ice (ice con-
centration) is more than 15%. (NMCE, 2015).
According to the Management Plan (NMCE, 2015), the con-
sequences of a potential oil spill depend on the type and properties of
the oil released, the nature of the receiving environment and the
specific circumstances of the accident, and that “the potential con-
sequences will be most serious if a spill could affect areas where there
are high densities of vulnerable species or areas of vulnerable habitat,
such as the marginal ice zone and coastal waters” (NMCE, 2015). The
plan also specifies that spills in the open sea could have serious impacts,
especially at certain times when there are high densities of vulnerable
seabirds (NMCE, 2015).
Industry risk assessments provide input to the management plans.
Risk assessments are a compulsory part of the impact assessments as
required by the Petroleum Act, and they need to be carried out before
new areas for petroleum activities are opened (Norwegian Petroleum,
2018). The industry risk assessments are generally based on worst-case
scenarios (as defined by the industry) i.e. on consequences of a po-
tential blow-out (Hauge et al., 2014). The Barents Sea Exploration
Collaboration (BASEC), which has been established by central Norwe-
gian oil operators, aims to develop a common approach to operating in
the newly opened areas (23rd concession round) in the Norwegian
Barents Sea (NOROG 2018). The work of BaSEC covers also environ-
ment and oil spill preparedness: they have published a joint BaSEC risk
assessment for block 7435/ 9 (situated in the 74th parallel, 380 km
from the nearest land area with a distance of approximately 440 km to
Fig. 1. Announcement of 24th licensing round (red blocks are the newly opened areas, grey ones are active exploration sites). Reprinted from Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate (NPD, 2017b) with permission.
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Fig. 2. Particularly valuable and vulnerable areas as defined in the 2015 management plan. The marginal ice zone is based on data on sea ice extent for the period
1985−2014. Reprinted from Norwegian Ministry for Climate and Environment (NMCE, 2015) with permission.
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the Norwegian mainland). The BaSEC risk assessment for includes oil
spill modelling of the dimensioning spill scenarios including both top-
side and subsea blowout scenarios (BaSEC, 2015). The environmental
risk analysis is carried out by combining oil drift modelling with various
environmental resource data (BaSEC, 2015).
The BaSEC risk assessments assess different environmental re-
sources: these are referred to as Valued Ecological Components (VECs)
covering seabirds, marina mammals, coastal habitats, fish, and the
marginal ice zone (BaSEC, 2015). According to the risk assessment
(BaSEC, 2015), the most likely impacts are limited to the open sea areas
and resources at the sea surface. Risks to the marginal ice zone are
considered relevant in the late winter/ early spring when ice extends at
its maximum. The weather conditions affect the position of the mar-
ginal ice zone (as defined in the management plan (≥15% concentra-
tion) and in case of rare weather conditions, the sea ice might move
further South to cover the release location, and the oil might be trapped
within/ underneath the ice. These would have consequences to the
natural resources within the marginal ice zone, such as Ivory gull
(Pagophila eburnea), which is defined as threatened species, and dif-
ferent marine mammal species. (BaSEC, 2015)
The risk assessments use different datasets based on different as-
sumptions. For example, when assessing the enviro ntal risks to bird
populations, the industry assessment differs from the more conservative
risk assessments used in the management plans: whereas the manage-
ment plan uses “average distributions” from several years of counting
data and covering the total Barents Sea area (SEAPOP- data= data
provided by research institutions and industry), the BASEC assessment
also uses DNV GL (data provided by industry) datasets of dynamic re-
source modelling based on gls-logger data that provides actual, site-
specific data of the location of the seabirds at a certain time of the year
(BaSEC, 2015). The DNV GL datasets are considered to increase the
precision and reduce the uncertainties of consequence assessments
(BaSEC, 2015).
3. Theoretical framework
Conventionally, risks are considered in technical terms and under-
stood as probabilities and consequences, but many now argue that the
complex nature of risks cannot be understood or managed with tradi-
tional risk assessment tools alone (de Marchi, 2015; Klinke and Renn,
2012; Renn et al., 2011; Slovic, 2001). The central role of science in the
governance of highly complex and controversial risks related to e.g.
nuclear energy, genetically modified organisms, and nanotechnology
has been scrutinized by a body of authors (Failing et al., 2007; Gregory
et al., 2006; Jasanoff, 1998, 2003; Rowe and Frewer, 2005; Wynne,
2011; Yearley, 2000). As Gregory et al. (2006) highlight, science can
provide us knowledge about the nature of issues and alert us of pro-
blems, but it cannot tell us what to do or who should be involved - more
specifically, it cannot tell us about the social, cultural, or economic
importance of the consequences of changes in the natural environment.
We apply risk frames as a conceptual tool to explore ambiguity re-
lated to oil spill risks in the Barents Sea. Ambiguity is often dis-
tinguished from uncertainty and defined as the differing ways on un-
derstanding and interpreting risks as well as the acceptability and/or
tolerability of risks (Renn et al., 2011). Here, drawing on the work of
Brugnach et al. (2008, 2011) on water resources management, ambi-
guity is defined as a distinct type of uncertainty that refers to the dif-
ferent ways of understanding, interpreting, and knowing reality
(Brugnach et al., 2008; Brugnach and Ingram, 2012). Ambiguity is
considered as the product of a socio-technical-environmental context,
i.e. its frame (Brugnach et al., 2008; Brugnach and Ingram, 2012). The
framing of a resource management situation defines the issue at stake as
well as who is included and how (Brugnach et al., 2008). The processes
of framing define the outcome and the direction of management pro-
cesses as the formulation of a problem in a different way elicits distinct
preferences, different kinds of knowledge, and points towards different
solutions (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007; Brugnach and Ingram, 2012).
Ambiguity is considered to be based on differences in 1) the type of
knowledge production processes, and consequently 2) how knowledge
is understood (Brugnach and Ingram, 2012). Exploring ambiguity re-
quires the re-thinking of what constitutes as relevant knowledge and
the way that knowledge production translates to policy. In con-
temporary knowledge production processes, knowledge is generally
conceived as scientific facts that objectively represent the reality
(Wynne, 2005; Jasanoff, 1998, 1995). The conventional view of
knowledge posits that more knowledge results in a better picture of risk:
reducing uncertainty through research leads to better understandability
and control of risks (Fazey et al., 2014; Jasanoff, 1995; Sarewitz and
Pielke, 2007). Further, the process of translating scientific knowledge
into policy is considered linear (Nutley et al., 2007). However, this way
of defining knowledge undermines other forms of knowledge and ig-
nores the relational part of knowledge, i.e. the value-laden relational
aspect that refers to e.g. who is being included or excluded from the
problem understanding (Bouwen, 2001). Collaborative framing pro-
cesses are essential in integrating social values into technical decisions
and in coping with ambiguity (Brugnach et al., 2011; Brugnach, 2017;
Lejano and Ingram, 2009; Renn et al., 2011). The integration of dif-
ferent types of knowledges in risk governance can contribute to de-
veloping efficient governance measures and support the legitimacy of
the measures and the commitment to policy (Failing et al., 2007;
Gregory et al., 2006; Jasanoff, 1998, 2003).
In order to explore the risk frames related to oil spill risk governance
in the Barents Sea, we use semi-structured interviews to construct
qualitative mental models. Mental modelling can help to understand
complex socio-ecological problems by uncovering how stakeholders
perceive the linkages between different drivers/ causes, and by visua-
lising the different views and priorities such as competing goals and
alternative management decisions (Jones et al., 2011; Voinov and
Bousquet, 2010). This allows for enhancing the understanding of
complex, uncertain, systems and improving communication, discussion,
and debate (Haapasaari et al., 2012; Voinov and Bousquet, 2010).
Mental models are described as individually and internally held
cognitive structures that are used to filter and store information and
that allow individuals to reason, explain and interact with their sur-
roundings (Jones et al., 2011). Mental models can be elicited with the
use of e.g. fuzzy cognitive mapping (van Vliet et al., 2010; Özesmi and
Özesmi, 2004; Jones et al., 2011); agent-based modelling (Janssen and
Ostrom, 2006); or the use of Bayesian networks (BNs) (Aalders, 2008;
Castelletti and Soncini-Sessa, 2007; Carriger et al., 2018; Haapasaari
et al., 2012; Neil et al., 2000; Stewart et al., 2014).
Here, we elicit mental models using influence diagrams based on the
logic of Bayesian networks. With the use of the influence diagram based
mental modelling approach, we hope to provide insight into the gov-
ernance of complex risks and examine how ambiguity and different
ways of knowing can be coped with in risk governance. Bayesian net-
works are widely applied to decision-making in environmental and
fisheries management (Aalders, 2008; Haapasaari et al., 2012; Uusitalo,
2007; Kuikka and Varis, 1997) including studies on the environmental
impacts of oil spills (Lecklin et al., 2011; Nevalainen et al., 2017) and
oil spill risk management (Carriger and Barron, 2011; Helle et al., 2015;
Lehikoinen et al., 2015; Montewka et al., 2013). BNs can be constructed
as influence diagrams by including decision and utility nodes in the
network, describing the probabilistic paths from decision nodes to the
utility functions. BN-based influence diagrams include both qualitative
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(graphic) and quantitative data. Here, only qualitative data was in-
cluded, but similarly to other mental modelling tools, the influence
diagrams could be further built into quantitative models: this aids the
designing of further quantitative studies and can be a useful tool for
interdisciplinary research (Carriger et al., 2018; Neil et al., 2000;
Nyberg et al., 2006; Voinov and Bousquet, 2010).
For the purpose of this study, seven semi-structured interviews
(each between 2–3 h) were conducted (see Table 1). The participants
interviewed included an industry representative, local municipality
representative, governmental authority, and four researchers (from the
fields of fisheries science, maritime law, social sciences, and maritime
safety and engineering). The interviewees selected were considered to
be information-rich and have a good understanding of the topic. The
anonymity of the interviewees was guaranteed by means of coding
system (see Table 1). The interviews consisted of an introduction to the
study and to the logic of mental modelling and drawing the mental
models, elicitation of the interviewees’ mental models including the
identification of the key management measures and knowledge actions.
The participants were then asked how they perceive the key impacts/
threats of oil spills in the newly opened areas. This was followed by the
constructing of the influence diagrams where the participants were
asked to describe 1) what should be objectives of risk governance, 2)
what kind of management/ governance measures could or should be
used to reach these objectives, and 3) what factors, and relationships
between factors, affect achieving the objectives. Three types of vari-
ables were used to build the influence diagrams: utility variables de-
fining the objectives (depicted as diamonds); decision variables that are
directly controllable (depicted as rectangles); and the uncertain re-
levant variables of oil spill risk governance (depicted as ovals). The
assumed strength of the relationships between different variables was
depicted in arrows of different strength: a thin arrow depicted a weak
effect, a medium arrow a moderate effect, and a thick arrow a strong
effect.
The final part of the interview (not included in the influence dia-
gram) comprised questions related to knowledge needs, production and
communication. Here, interviewees were asked to identify the three
main knowledge needs in terms of risk governance by choosing the
three most important variables included in the mental models. They
were then asked about the type of knowledge as well as knowledge
producers they considered important in risk governance. Final question
related to knowledge communication and the factors that enable or
restrict knowledge sharing and communication. The interviews were
recorded and transcribed as soon as possible after the interviews took
place. The models were then finalized by the interviewer and the par-
ticipants were given the chance to review the finalised versions after-
wards. The changes included minor changes e.g. in the strength of ar-
rows or better formulation of the written text.
The validity of the research was assessed through data triangula-
tion: data was double-checked by asking different interviewees the
same information and by corroborating interview accounts with on-site
observation and the use of additional, shorter and informal, interviews
(INF 8, 9, 10, 11). Afterwards, the data was also cross-referenced with
government documents and regulations, research, and newspaper ar-
ticles.
Table 1
Interview information and the coding system *additional, shorter interviews.
Type of organisation Code in the paper Interview date (month and year)
Industry association IND-1 Nov-17
Research center RES-1 Jan-18
Municipal authority MUN-1 Nov-17
Research center RES-2 Nov-17
Research center RES-3 Nov-17
Research center RES-4 Nov-17
Governmental authorities GOV-1 Nov-17
Municipal authority MUN-2* Nov-17
Locals LOC-9* / LOC-
10*
Nov-17
Fisheries association FIS-11* Nov-17
Fig. 3. Model of IND-1. Causal chains linking the measures (depicted as rectangles) and the relevant variables (depicted as ovals) to the governance objectives
(depicted as diamonds). The strength of the perceived dependencies between the variables are marked with different strength arrows (thin, medium or thick arrows).
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4. Risk frames
4.1. Industry association (IND-1): protect the key species and areas
The participant focused on the risk of a blow-out from offshore
operations and its environmental impacts, and emphasized industry
standards and the national management plans as the most important
ways to achieve the environmental objectives. The overall objectives
(depicted as diamond-shaped) of oil spill risk governance were to
protect the environment, i.e. protecting the ecosystems linked to the
marginal ice zone and the sea birds (Fig. 3; for a full list of objectives
identified by the respondents, see Table A1. in Appendix A). The sea
birds mentioned included globally declining ones that are protected
under international convention, e.g. Guillemot (Uria aalge) and the
Brünnich’s guillemot (Uria Lomvia).
In order to reach the environmental objectives, the interviewee
highlighted the role of the current industry safety standards and the
national ecosystem-based management plan for the Barents Sea: the
thick arrows linking these two measures (depicted as rectangles) to the
objectives indicate that the person sees a strong dependency between
the measures and achieving the objectives (Fig. 3). The person also
favoured preventive measures (as indicated by the thick arrow between
the preventive measures and the objectives) over response measures.
National regulations and international collaboration (see Fig. 3; for a
full list of measures identified by the respondents, see Table A2. in
Appendix A) were seen to have a smaller role in achieving the objec-
tives as shown by the intermediate strength arrow (Fig. 3).
The participant considered that more scientific knowledge (pro-
duced by the industry, consulting companies, universities as well as
state agencies) was needed concerning the environmental impacts of oil
spills and the sensitivity of organisms to oil. The participant also saw
that further knowledge was needed on the movement of ocean currents
and ice and the effectiveness of response measures (for a full list of
knowledge needs, knowledge sources and knowledge communication,
see Table A3. in Appendix A).
4.2. Research center (RES-1): complex ecosystem and species-specific
impacts
The respondent stressed the environmental impacts of oil spills and
considered the national management plans as the main measures to
reduce the impacts. The respondent considered protecting the eco-
system in general as an objective, and more specifically the goals in-
cluded preventing potential impact on pelagic juvenile fish and to
vulnerable stages of Arctic species found in the marginal ice zone, such
as the polar cod (Boreogadus saida) (Fig. 4).
The interviewee focused on the role of the management plan for the
Barents Sea in reaching the environmental objectives: this is shown by
the chain of intermediate and thick arrows linking management plan
for the Barents Sea with the objective of protecting the ecosystem. The
role of the Institute of Marine Research (IMR), under the Norwegian
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, was considered to have a
strong effect (as indicated by the thick arrow) on producing knowledge
of species, sensitivities, ecosystem structure and functioning, which
then had a strong effect in reducing uncertainty and, in the end, pro-
tecting the ecosystem (Fig. 4). Models on early life stages of fish con-
tributed to knowledge production: the models are based on IMR’s la-
boratory and field research data as well as ocean circulations models
(from other research institutes).
The respondent considered that more knowledge, in the form of
peer-reviewed articles, was needed on the environmental impacts of oil
spill e.g. on the ecosystem impacts of potential oil spills; on the species-
specific sensitivity to oil; and on threshold concentrations of oil that
will not lead to any effect.
4.3. Municipal authority (MUN-1): maintaining local economy is important
The respondent considered social and transport safety-related ob-
jectives important, and highlighted the need for new regulations con-
cerning safety and industry operations to reach these objectives. The
specific objectives identified were to maintain and improve transport
safety (related to transport of oil as well as personnel and/ or the in-
frastructure), improve monitoring of maritime operations, job creation,
and reducing the impact on the way of living in the coastal areas
(Fig. 5).
The respondent identified several chains of strong arrows linking
the measures with objectives. Regulations concerning safety were
considered to have a strong effect on search and rescue (SAR) criteria
for rescue operations and finally, for maintaining and improving
transport safety. Establishing a permanent SAR-center in Vardo was
Fig. 4. Model of RES-1.
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considered important – this would have a strong effect for improving
satellite monitoring (for weather and ice conditions, oil spill detection
and fishing activity) and in creating local jobs. The respondent also
identified new measures in order to reach the social objectives, such as
an industry obligation to invest in onshore industry and development
(thick arrow), and an additional industry tax (thin arrow) to support
local benefit sharing.
The interviewee identified new knowledge needs related to trans-
port safety, including knowledge on weather conditions and Arctic
specific conditions; the impact of those on operations (both platforms
and shipping); and crew competence operating in the Arctic. Important
knowledge producers included satellites, ships, and platforms. The re-
spondent also suggested that the industry should have an obligation to
provide necessary information (e.g. monitoring results) and considered
establishing an open ‘data bank’ with different knowledge sources as a
means to improve public knowledge of the operations and the risks
related to those.
Fig. 5. Model of MUN-1.
Fig. 6. Model of RES-2.
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4.4. Research center (RES-2): preventing risks from drilling operations and
shipping
The respondent focused on safety related risks and objectives, and
identified a range of measures (from international and national regula-
tions to industry safety standards, and to improving safety culture) to
improve safety of both shipping and offshore drilling operations.
Prevention of blow-outs was considered as the main objective (1), fol-
lowed by preventing impacts on the shoreline (2), the ice ridge i.e. the ice
edge (3), and the wild life (4) (Fig. 6). The other objectives included the
prevention of accidents; the safety of tanker traffic; establishing safety
culture; and establishing sufficient preparedness and response measures.
Coordinated response and prevention organisations were considered
to have a strong effect in both prevention of accident and in terms of
efficient response measures (Fig. 6). This person believed that the
prevention of accidents was strongly depended on the Norwegian
Coastal Directorate (under the Norwegian government): this can be
seen from chain of thick links from the Norwegian Coastal Directorate
to response equipment, then to coordinated response and prevention
organisations and, finally, to prevention of accidents. Similarly, in-
dustry safety standards contributed to efficient response measures
(thick arrow). The International Convention for the Prevention of Pol-
lution (MARPOL) and safety culture were also considered important for
the prevention of accidents.
New knowledge needs identified by participant related to response
planning and safety, and included knowledge on the behaviour of oil in
ice-infested waters; the effectiveness of response equipment and mea-
sures; and safety culture. The industry and research bodies were con-
sidered as important and relevant knowledge providers.
4.5. Research center (RES-3): ineffectiveness of the current response
methods
The respondent emphasized environmental, social, economic and
safety-related risks and objectives. Similarly to the previous respondent,
here, too, the importance of coordinated oil spill response system was
highlighted. The main risks included the impacts of a potential oil spill
to the shoreline, the living organisms (on the shore and in the water
column), and fisheries and tourism. The specific objectives included
prevention of accidents and effective response, which both had a strong
effect on the most important objective: protecting human health, en-
vironment, and investments (in the order of importance).
The respondent emphasized the need for a well-organized oil spill
response system in the Barents Sea both at national and bi-lateral
(Norwegian-Russian co-operation) level. The person believed that
training and exercises, both national and joint with Russia, were
strongly linked (thick arrows) to coordination of oil spill response. In
addition, defining acceptable risks was linked to the prevention of ac-
cidents: while scientific knowledge production was seen as important,
normative societal participation was also considered necessary in terms
of defining and assessing the acceptability and tolerability of risks.
Knowledge needs identified ranged from the ecosystem impacts of a
potential oil spill to the performances and effectiveness of response
technology, and to the coordination of effective response. While dif-
ferent governmental agencies as well as universities were considered as
important knowledge producers, the interviewee emphasized that there
was a need for public debates, hearings, and meetings to support wider
societal participation in assessing risks related to the oil industry op-
erations. Updating management plans and monitoring (coordinated by
the Coastal administration) were included as important ways of com-
municating knowledge.
4.6. Research center (RES-4): new rules on participation needed
Here, environmental, social, economic, and safety-related risks and
objectives were highlighted. The respondent emphasized the need for
updating and improving the national regulations related to risk gov-
ernance i.e. the decision-making process itself. The environmental risks
included the impacts to the ecosystem of the marginal ice zone, but also
impacts of produced water (water produced as a by-product along with
oil and gas) to the environment. Social and economic risks included
potential impacts to fishing industry and coastal communities, and the
financial risks of the offshore operations. The objectives identified were
“clean environment”, “safety and security”, “preparedness and proce-
dures culture”. The objectives also included transparent and partici-
patory governance of risks (Fig. 8).
Fig. 7. Model of RES-3.
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As a single policy action, the rules on participation dominate, as it
has several strong and short pathways to the objective variables e.g. the
thick arrow linking “rules on participation”, “participation” and the
objective of transparent decision-making. The respondent stressed that
more attention should be paid on the issues of uncertainty, societal
values, and power, and how these relate to risk assessments and the
decision-making processes of opening (or not opening) new areas for
operations. Opened areas and power relations had strong effect on the
object of clean environment, but in the current situation, these were
considered as negative effects.
In terms of knowledge needs, the interviewee considered that more
attention should be paid on the uncertainty, ambiguity, and power re-
lations in decision-making, as well as on the strengths and limitations of
scientific knowledge in decision-making processes. Wide range of
knowledge producers were considered to be important, including re-
search centres as well as local and traditional knowledge holders.
Providing new venues or forums for stakeholder interaction were con-
sidered important for knowledge sharing.
4.7. Governmental authority (GOV-1): risks to traditional livelihoods and
culture
The respondent stressed the environmental and socio-cultural risks:
petroleum industry operations contribute to climate change, and the
environmental impacts of climate change have serious implications on
Sami livelihood and Sami culture. The prevention of oil spills was the
most important objective and it was linked to the objective of ensuring
environmental and cultural sustainability. The third objective was en-
suring effective response plans (Fig. 9).
The interviewee highlighted the importance of international reg-
ulations as indicated by the strong and intermediate paths linking the
regulations with the objective of reaching environmental and cultural
Fig. 8. Model of RES-4.
Fig. 9. Model of GOV-1.
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sustainability. The UN Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples (ILO 169), ratified by Norway in 1990, was seen to have a
strong effect on obligatory consultations with the Sami Parliament of
Norway or with affected Sami entities before undertaking projects that
can directly affect them. The consultations were seen to contribute to
the use of traditional knowledge, which was considered to have a strong
effect on environmental and cultural sustainability. Also the impact of
the UN Convention on reducing GHG emissions was sees as important
(thick arrow) for environmental and cultural sustainability.
The interviewee considered that the use of indigenous knowledge in
addition to scientific knowledge could improve the governance of oil
spill risks. Relevant knowledge producers included different Sami in-
stitutions (e.g. Sami Center of University of Tromso). The participation
of the Sami Parliament in the work of the Norwegian research council
was seen as an important channel to share and promote traditional
knowledge. Other ways of improving knowledge dissemination in-
cluded the use of traditional knowledge in impact assessments.
5. Discussion
This study indicates that the current risk governance framework
inadequately addresses the multiple risk frames included in this ana-
lysis. The current oil spill risk governance framework in the Barents Sea
can be considered comprehensive spanning from the ecosystem-based
management plans and technical risk assessments to the different reg-
ulatory measures and the use of strict industry standards. The study,
however, indicates that the existing governance framework fails to treat
the ambiguity around oil spill risks: the current risk assessments and
risk management do not reflect on the multiple ways in which the
participants in this study 1) frame the problem situation, 2) how they
identify different measures to manage risks, and 3) what are considered
as key knowledge needs and knowledge producers by the participants.
This is problematic since ignoring and rejecting the various perspectives
can block the formulation of effective solutions. We suggest that col-
laborative knowledge production and social learning are needed to
move towards developing shared understanding of the problem situa-
tion.
This study demonstrates that the current management approach
focuses on the acute risks to key species, but as the results illustrate, the
participants in this study defined risks and governance objectives in
multiple ways (for a summary of objectives, see Table 2; for a full list of
objectives see Table A2. in Appendix A). As demonstrated earlier, the
management plans and the industry risk assessments both frame risks in
a very specific way by focusing on worst-case scenarios (blow-out
scenarios) and on the immediate effects of an oil spill on key species in
the areas that are defined as particularly valuable and vulnerable in the
management plans, i.e. the marginal ice zone. The low probability of
risks as well as the history of few, preceding, major-scale accidents is
also highlighted. The dominant position of the industry in assessing and
defining the risks is further supported by previous studies on petroleum
operations to the Lofoten and Senja islands (Hauge et al., 2014).
However, what counts as significant when evaluating and assessing
risks as well as what constitutes as an appropriate solution are not
merely scientific questions but value-based (Hauge et al., 2014;
Brugnach, 2017). The influence diagrams reveal the complex nature of
risks by demonstrating considerable differences in the interests of the
different societal stakeholders i.e. differing values and ways of
knowing. The participants in this study emphasized a wide range of
environmental (complex ecosystem and species-specific impacts, im-
pacts of routine operations e.g. produced waters, risk of seismic
shooting to fish), economic (impacts to fishing industry and tourism,
financial risks of the operations to Norwegian taxpayers), and social
risks, including both the long-term local and global consequences of
offshore drilling operations e.g. how offshore drilling contributes to
climate change. Consequently, also the objectives of risk governance
differed among the participants (See Figs. 3–9; Table 2). Protecting the
environment and preventing oil spill from taking place are objectives
shared by most of the participants. However, protecting the environ-
ment was defined in various ways (See Table A1. in Appendix A). In
addition, some of the objectives were model-specific.
The influence diagrams shed light on how the participants perceive
and understand the system as a whole and how the system can be
manipulated so that the objectives can be reached. The strength of the
arrows (between the different measures, variables and objectives) de-
scribes how strong effect each of the decision variables has in pushing
the system to a desired direction. Strong arrows or strong chains of
arrows linking measures to the governance objectives demonstrate that
effective ways to control the risks exist or can be developed. A wide
range of measures were identified in this study (See Figs. 3–9; Table 3;
for a full list of measures, see Table A2. in Appendix A). A summary of
the main measures is presented in Table 3, where the measures are
categorized into strong, moderate, and weak measures. The results in-
dicate that the current management measures (i.e. the management
plans, industry safety standards, and prevention and response system)
were identified by the respondents as ways of reaching some of the
objectives, but were not always considered as strong measures. For
example, the management plan was identified by several respondents,
but only one respondent considered it to be strongly linked to another
variable (see Table 3). In addition, new measures were considered ne-
cessary. It must, however, be noted that the ‘overall’ effectiveness of the
measure depends on both the strength of the arrows and the length of
the chains as every variable adds weight to the chain but also decreases
the precision to achieve the desired aims. A further, quantitative,
analysis could provide a more detailed picture of the relationships be-
tween the variables.
The influence diagrams differ in the level of complexity, i.e. in the
number of variables included and in the number of links identified
between these variables. For example, RES-1 mainly discusses the risks
to juvenile fish in the Barents Sea. Similarly, the influence diagram of
GOV-1 focuses on the risks of offshore drilling and climate change to
the Sami culture and livelihoods. One may conclude, that it is natural
that participants restrict the model only to such variables, which have a
meaning in how well their specific aims are achieved.
The influence diagrams illustrate the socially constructed nature of
risks as well as the inherently subjective nature of risk assessments.
Özesmi and Özesmi (2004) suggest that by examining the structure of
Table 2
Summary of objectives as identified by the participants.
IND-1 RES-1 MUN-1 RES-2 RES-3 RES-4 GOV-1
Protecting the environment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
Prevention of accidents ○ ○ ○ ○
Effective response plans ○ ○ ○
Safety ○ ○ ○
Establish safety culture ○ ○
Job creation and reducing impact on way of living ○
Transparent governance ○
Sufficient participation ○
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mental maps, we can identify groups who can act as “catalyst for
change”: these include participants that perceive more relationships
and thus have more options to change the system. Defining and asses-
sing risks can be seen as an exercise in power: the dominant bodies have
the power to define both the risks and the solutions (Slovic, 2001). As
shown above, the participants identify ways to change the current risk
governance framework, but their actual capacity to do so depends on
social, political and economic factors (Özesmi and Özesmi, 2004).
In sum, the influence diagrams provided a valuable tool for ex-
ploring ambiguity related to a complex risk and presenting risk frames
in a clear, visual, form. While the participants were given an in-
troduction to constructing influence diagrams based on the Bayesian
network logic, the diagrams show some differences e.g. in what con-
stituted as a controllable variable according to the participant or what
the arrows between the variables signified. This may be due to various
reasons such as issues in communication between the interviewer and
the participant and, consequently, how well the logic was understood
by each of the participants. It must also be remembered, that modelling
tools, such as influence diagrams, are always simplifications, and are
not generally good at capturing all the nuances and small details in a
system. The benefit of the method also includes that it can be quantified
in future work thus supporting interdisciplinary work by using raw
data, simulation models or expert judgements. In sum, the networks
were powerful tools for providing general overview of a problem or
issue.
The lack of knowledge can obstruct the adequate assessing of risks
(AMAP, 2017a). The influence diagrams demonstrate the limited
knowledge of the system as a whole (see also Table 4 for a list of the
Table 3
Summary of the main measures as identified by the respondents: dark blue dots refer to strong
measures that are linked with at least one thick arrow to another variable, light blue dots refer to
moderate measures linked with at least one medium arrow, and transparent dots refer to weak
measures linked with thin arrows *indicates new measures suggested by the respondents.
Table 4
The main knowledge needs identified by the respondents.
IND-1 Movement of ocean currents and ice; Oil spill impacts and sensitivity of organisms; Effectiveness of response measures
RES-1 Ecosystem impacts; Species specific sensitivity to oil; Threshold concentrations of oil that will not lead to any effect; The effects of management actions
MUN-1 Weather conditions Arctic specific conditions; Impact of those on operations (both platforms and shipping); Crew competence
RES-2 Behaviour of oil in ice-infested waters; Developing response equipment and measures; Safety culture
RES-3 Ecosystem impacts; Behaviour of oil in ice infested waters; Weather conditions and their impact on technology; Performances and effectiveness of technology; Defining
acceptable criteria Coordination of effective response
RES-4 Uncertainty and ambiguity in decision-making; Strengths and limitations of objective knowledge; Power relations
GOV-1 Indigenous knowledge
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main knowledge needs). For example, in the newly opened areas, the
current response measures are considered largely ineffective (RES-2;
RES-3), but at the same time the public knowledge on the level of ef-
fectiveness is considered poor (RES-3). The lack of sufficient access to
response equipment in the Finnmark region hinders the clean-up op-
eration should a major spill happen (RES-3, GOV-1). In addition, the
consequences are not only limited to Norway, but oil spills would have
cross-border effects. This is problematic especially since no compre-
hensive knowledge exists on impacts of Arctic marine oil spills
(Mäkinen and Vanhatalo, 2018; Nevalainen et al., 2018; NMPE,
2017a,2017b) and there is no existing oil spill compensation agreement
between Norway and Russia (NMPE, 2017a,2017b).
Furthermore, the consequences of a potential oil spill to different
marine species and the ecosystem are uncertain and difficult to analyse.
As shown by previous research (Knol, 2010a, 2010b), while un-
certainties are recognized by the industry and in the management plans,
they are not explicitly addressed but turned into new knowledge needs
i.e. calls for more research. Even though uncertainties related to the risk
of a blow-out and the potential impacts to the key species are con-
sidered in the industry risk assessments, these are considered as con-
trollable with the development and use of new technologies, e.g. by
using dynamic resource modelling (based on Global Land Surveys (gls)-
logger data provided by industry itself) in the BaSEC industry to as-
sessments to improve the accuracy of data on the location of seabirds.
The dominant approach to assessing and managing risks thus confirms
to the conventional view of knowledge where reducing uncertainty
through research is considered to lead to better understanding and
control of risks and where scientific knowledge can be translated into
policy in a linear manner.
Under the current governance framework, the dominant risk frame
defines both how risks are defined and how relevant knowledge is
understood and who/what are considered as important knowledge
producers. This becomes especially apparent in the debate around how
to define the marginal ice zone (MIZ). The MIZ is identified as parti-
cularly valuable and vulnerable area, but in the 2015 management
plan, the MIZ has been delimited to better present the current ice
conditions. This has allowed for the opening of new areas for drilling
operations further in the North. However, as the ice edge is dynamic,
defining the area is a complex issue, where the prediction of future ice
cover is difficult. The ice edge can also be considered as a social
construct that can be defined in various ways (RES-4). The re-definition
of the marginal ice zone was criticized by environmental organisations
as well as Polar Institute and the Environmental Agency. They have also
consistently advised against the opening of the northernmost blocks in
the 23rd and 24th licensing round (NMPE, 2017; Greenpeace, 2017).
Finally, the decision to delimit the marginal ice zone was rejected by
the Norwegian Parliament and the government was ordered to revisit
the definition (Stortinget, 2015). Here, recognizing the relational part
of knowledge and the limits of science is important. The decision over
how to define the MIZ is not merely a scientific question and objective,
but highly value-laden and polemic.
To better cope with diversity of values and different knowledge
systems, we propose that there is a need for acknowledging the limits to
one’s knowledge and to develop and support inclusive participative
decision-making processes (Fig. 10).
We posit that instead of accepting only one valid frame, we need to
move towards creating a connected frame and developing shared un-
derstanding of problem situation and solutions where multiple frames
and multiple ways of knowing are considered relevant in governance/
decision-making processes (Brugnach et al., 2008; Failing et al., 2007;
Slovic, 2001). Examples ranging from collaborative water management
in California (Lejano and Ingram, 2009) to coastal governance in Aus-
tralia (Clarke et al., 2013) and participative planning processes in
Alaska (Robards et al., 2018) highlight that integrating different
worldviews and perspectives are essential in solving complex socio-
ecological problems. Further studies are needed at a more detailed level
to discover e.g. how collaborative knowledge production could be
supported and implemented in practice in the Norwegian context.
Collaborative knowledge production processes go beyond the calls
for greater participation and approaches that do not focus on power
relations or on the need for change (Brugnach, 2017; Evans and O’Brien
2015). Instead of presenting ambiguity and diversity of views as sources
of conflict that need to be avoided, ambiguity may be considered as a
source of innovation and creativity as well as an opportunity for
transformation (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012). Influence diagrams can be
used to facilitate social learning allowing the stakeholders to represent
their thinking at multiple levels (Chapin et al., 2009; Henly-Shepard
et al., 2015; Özesmi and Özesmi, 2004). Social learning can support
transformative processes: multi-loop learning puts focus on questions
such as “are we dealing with the right problem” forcing the participants
Fig. 10. Towards collaborative knowledge production and learning where ambiguity is resolved by creating a connected frame that represents a shared view on the
problem. Adapted from figure created by Chapin et al (2009) and the work of Brugnach and Ingram (2012).
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to reflect on governance norms and principles and requires integrating
different ways of knowing (Armitage et al. 2007). While new alter-
native, e.g. post-petroleum, pathways have already materialized at
local/ regional level (UNIIN-BARENTS, 2018; Dale and Kristoffersen,
2018), at national level, petroleum industry is still considered a key
source for future economic security (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy
2011; Dale, 2016; Dale and Kristoffersen, 2018).
6. Conclusions
Opening new areas for petroleum industry in the Arctic remains a
controversial issue. This study suggests that further attention should be
paid on the process of framing risks and on the socially constructed
nature of risks. With the use of influence diagrams based mental
modelling tools, we study the way risks are understood and defined,
and how the measures to reduce those risks are identified. We also
analyse the type of knowledge and knowledge sources that the risk
frames are based on.
Our analysis shows that the current governance framework is unapt
to integrate the multiple risk frames and knowledge systems into de-
cision-making processes. Further attention should be paid on the limits
of science in solving inherently value-based socio-ecological problems.
This should be an integral part of the process and design of e.g. the new
management plans, such as the 2020 updated management plan for the
Barents Sea. Questions such as who should take part in identifying and
evaluating risks; who are seen as relevant or as ‘experts’ in assessing
risks and who are not; what governance measures are considered as
important; and who should be involved to ensure the legitimacy of the
decisions, need to be explored when making decisions over opening
new areas for maritime industry operations. Finally, we posit that col-
laborative knowledge production processes and social learning are
needed to better cope with ambiguity. Recognizing the validity of the
different risk frames is the first step forward. We suggest that ambiguity
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Appendix A
Table A1
Objectives (categorized under general headings) identified by the respondents.
IND-1 RES-1 MUN-1 RES-2 RES-3 RES-4 GOV-1
Protecting the environment Protecting the marginal ice zone X
Protecting sea birds X
Preventing impact on pelagic juvenile fish X
Protecting the ecosystem X
Preventing impact to vulnerable stages of Arctic species in the MIZ X
Preventing impact on shoreline, ice edge, and wildlife X
Protecting human health, environment, investments X
Clean environment X
Sustainable operations (economic, environment, culture) X
Prevention of accidents Preparedness X
Prevention of accidents X X
Prevention of oil spills X
Effective response plans Efficient Response X X
Effective response plans X
Improved monitoring X
Safety Maintain and improve transport safety X
Safety/ security X
Safety of tanker traffic X
Establish safety culture X
Procedures culture X
Other Job creation and reducing impact on way of living X
Transparent governance X
Sufficient participation X
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